Introduction
In cooperative game theory, a central problem is to define a value, that is, a payoff to be given to each player, taking into account his contribution into the game. Among the many values proposed in the literature, two of them have deserved a lot of attention, namely the Shapley value [24] and the Banzhaf value [1] . Both of them satisfy basic properties as linearity, symmetry, which means that the payoff given does not depend on the way the players are numbered, and the null player property, saying that a player who does not bring any contribution in coalitions he joins should receive a zero payoff. A value satisying these three properties has necessarily the form of a weighted average of the marginal contribution of a given player into coalitions. The Shapley and Banzhaf values differ on the weights used when computing the average. In the Shapley value, the marginal contributions are weighted according to the size of the coalition, in order to satisfy efficiency, that is, the total payoff given to the players is equal to the total worth of the game. In other words, the "cake" is divided among the players with no waste. For the Banzhaf value, the weights are simply equal, and so do not depend on the size of the coalition. As a consequence, the Banzhaf value is not efficient in general.
Lack of efficiency could be perceived, in the context of cooperative game theory, as an undesirable feature. This explains why in this domain, the Shapley value is much more popular. However, there are contexts where efficiency is not a relevant issue or even does not make sense. This is the case for voting games and in multicriteria decision aid (MCDA). A voting game is a cooperative game which is 0-1-valued, the value 1 indicating that the coalition wins the election. In this context, the relevant notion is the power index, and the Banzhaf value is used as such. A power index indicates how central a player is for making a coalition winning (this is called a swing). Banzhaf [1, 5] has shown that for counting swings, no weight should be applied, and this directly leads to the Banzhaf value (called in this context Banzhaf power index or Banzhaf index). In MCDA, criteria can be interpreted as voters in a voting game, and here a power index becomes an importance index, quantifying how important in the final decision a criterion is. In both domains, efficiency simply does not make sense, so that the Banzhaf value/index should be considered perhaps more relevant than the Shapley value.
There are other reasons to consider the Banzhaf value as a natural concept. In order to establish this, we need to generalize the notion of value or power index to the notion of interaction index, especially meaningful in a MCDA context [7, 12, 13, 20] . The interaction index for a set S of criteria quantifies the way the criteria in S interact, that is, how the scores on criteria in S contribute to the overall score. It can be considered that the interaction index when S is a singleton amounts to the importance index, which leads to two types of interaction indices, one based on the Shapley value and the other based on the Banzhaf index. This being said, aggregation models in MCDA which are based on capacities (monotone cooperative games) can be of the Choquet integral type, multilinear type, or other integrals like Pan-integral, concave integral, decomposition integral, etc. (beside other types such as the Sugeno integral, suitable in an ordinal context). It has been proved by Grabisch et al. [11] that if the Choquet integral is used, the relevant interaction index is the Shapley interaction index, while in the case of the multilinear model, the Banzhaf index should be used. In addition, in computer sciences, the notion of Fourier Transform is defined and widely used, e.g., in cryptography (see, e.g., [4] ). It turns out that the Banzhaf interaction index and the Fourier transform differ only by some coefficient (see details in [8, Ch. 2.16.2] . Other connections exist, e.g., with the Sobol indices in statistics (see [10] ).
The aim of the paper is to establish the Banzhaf index and Banzhaf interaction index for multichoice games, which are a generalisation of cooperative games. Multichoice games allow each player to choose a certain level of participation, among k possible levels. Their counterpart in MCDA are very interesting since they encode any aggregation model with discrete attributes [22, 21] . To our knowledge, there is no definition of an interaction index for multichoice games. Nevertheless, Lange and Grabisch [17] have provided a general form of interaction index for games on lattices. This does not fit our analycis, that focuses on interaction index defined for groups of criteria. Our approach is to build these indices in an axiomatic way, using an approach similar to Weber [26] .
Preliminary definitions
We consider throughout a finite set of elements N = {1, . . . , n}, which could be players, agents in cooperative game theory, criteria, attributes in multi-criteria decision analysis, voters or political parties in voting theory. We often denote cardinality of sets S, T, . . . by corresponding small letters s, t, . . ., otherwise by the standard notation |S|, |T |, . . . . Moreover, we will often omit braces for singletons, e.g., writing N \ i instead of N \ {i}.
The set L is endowed with the usual partial order ≤: for any x, y ∈ L, x ≤ y if and only if x i ≤ y i for every i ∈ N . For each x ∈ L, we define the support of x by Σ(x) = {i ∈ N |x i > 0} and the kernel of x by K(x) = {i ∈ N |x i = k i }. Their cardinalities are respectively denoted by σ(x) and κ(x). For any x ∈ L and S ⊆ N , x S denotes the restriction of x to the set S, while x −S denotes the restriction of x to the set N \ S. For all alternatives x, y ∈ L and S ⊆ N , the notation (x S , y −S ) denotes the compound alternative z such that z i = x i if i ∈ S and y i otherwise. The same meaning is intended for L S and L −S .
In cooperative game theory, the set L i is interpreted as the set of activity levels of player i ∈ N , and any x ∈ L is called an activity profile. In an MCDA context, L i is the set of all possible values taken by (discrete) attribute i ∈ N , while x ∈ L is called an alternative. Throughout the paper, we adopt without limitation the terminology of game theory.
For convenience, we assume that all players have the same number of levels, i.e.,
A (cooperative) game on N is a set function v : 2 N → R vanishing on the empty set. A game v is said to be a capacity [2] or fuzzy measure [25] if it satisfies the mono-
Cooperative games can be seen as pseudo-Boolean functions vanishing at 0 N . A pseudo-Boolean function [3, 14] is any function f : {0, 1} N → R. Noting that any subset S of N can be encoded by its characteristic function 1 S , where 1 S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), with x i = 1 if i ∈ S and x i = 0 otherwise, there is a one-to-one correspondence between set functions and pseudo-Boolean functions: f (1 S ) = v(S) for every S ⊆ N . Therefore, a natural generalisation of games is multichoice games. A multichoice game [15] on N is a function v :
A monotonic multichoice game is called a k-ary capacity [9] . In a MCDA context, v(x) is the overall score of alternative x. For any x ∈ L, x = 0 N , the Dirac game δ x is defined by δ x (y) = 1 iff y = x, and 0 otherwise. We denote by G(L) the set of all multichoice games defined on L.
Banzhaf value and interaction indices
In this section we recall the concepts of value and interaction indices introduced in cooperative game theory. The notion of power index or value is one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory. A value [24] on N is a function φ :
, which is most often a share of v(N ), the total worth of the game. In the context where N is the set of voters, φ i (v) can be interpreted as the voting power of player i ∈ N in game v ∈ G(2 N ), i.e., to what extent the fact that i votes 'yes' makes the final decision to be 'yes'. In such a case, φ is called a power index. Obviously, power indices in voting theory are close to importance indices in MCDA. In cooperative game theory, diverse kinds of values/power indices have been proposed, among which a large part have the following form:
If the family of real constants {p i S , S ⊆ N \ i} forms a probability distribution, the value φ i is said to be a probabilistic value [26] .
The exact form of a value/power index depends on the axioms that are imposed on it. The two best known are due to Shapley [24] and Banzhaf [1] . The Banzhaf value [5] of a player i ∈ N in a game v ∈ G(2 N ) is defined by
It is uniquely axiomatized by a set of four axioms [5, 18] : linearity axiom, dummy axiom, symmetry axiom and 2-efficiency axiom. They will be recalled below.
Another interesting concept is that of interaction among criteria. An interaction index on N of the game v ∈ G(2 N ) is a function I v : 2 N → R that represents the amount of interaction (it can be positive or negative) among any subset of players. Grabisch and Roubens [12] proposed an axiomatic characterisation of the Shapley and the Banzhaf interaction indices. For this, they introduce the following definitions:
Let v be a game on N , and T a nonempty subset of N .
indicates a single hypothetical player, which is the union (or representative) of the players in T . It is defined as follows for any S ⊆ N \ T :
The following axioms have been considered by Grabisch and Roubens [12] : 
-Recursive axiom (R): For any v ∈ G(2 N ),
Theorem 1. (Grabisch and Roubens [12] ) Under (L), (D), (S), (2-E) and (R),
In particular, for a pair S = {i, j}, we obtain I v ({i, j}) = T ⊆N \{i,j}
as the cost/surplus of mutual externalities of players i and j [19] . More generally, δ i,j v(S) can be seen as the cost/surplus of mutual externalities of players i and j, in the presence of coalition S. The interaction index I v ({i, j}) is thus the expected cost/surplus of mutual externalities of players i and j.
In MCDA, recall that v(S) is the overall score of an option that is perfectly satisfactory (with score 1) on criteria S and completely unacceptable (with score 0) on the remaining criteria. The interaction index I v ({i, j}) can also be interpreted as the variation of the mean weight of criterion i when criterion j switches from the least satisfied criterion to the most satisfied criterion [16] . Positive interaction depicts situations where there is complementarity among criteria i and j: criteria i and j deserve to be well-satisfied together (the more criterion i is satisfied, the more it is important to satisfy as well criterion j). On the opposite side, negative interaction occurs when there is substitutability among criteria i and j: it is not rewarding to improve both criteria i and j together. 
Axiomatisation of the Banzhaf value for multichoice games
In this section, we give a characterisation of Banzhaf value for multichoice games, in the spirit of what was done by Weber [26] for cooperative games. Ridaoui et al. [22] have already generalized and axiomatized the Shapley value for multichoice games. The axiomatisation given in [22] is based on five axioms, linearity, nullity, symmetry, invariance and efficiency. We present the first four axioms used in [22] , as some of them will be used in our characterisation. It is worth mentioning that the use of such axioms is common in axiomatisation of values. Let φ be a value defined for any v ∈ G(L).
Linearity axiom (L)
: φ is linear on G(L), i.e., ∀v, w ∈ G(L), ∀α ∈ R,
Null axiom (N): If a player i is null for v ∈ G(L), then φ i (v) = 0.
Let π be a permutation on N . For all x ∈ L, we denote π(x) π(i) = x i . For all v ∈ G(L), the game π • v is defined by π • v(π(x)) = v(x).
Symmetry axiom (S):
For any permutation π of N ,
Invariance axiom (I): Let us consider two games
The linearity axiom means that if several multichoice games are combined linearly, the value of the resulting multichoice game is a linear combination of the values of each individual multichoice game. Axiom (N) states that a player having no influence on a multichoice game is not important. Axiom (S) says that the numbering of the players plays no role in the computation of value. Axiom (I) indicates that the computation of the value does not depend on the position on the grid. More precisely, if the game w is simply a shift of v of one unit on the grid, then v and w shall have the same value (importance).
Ridaoui et al. [22] have shown the following result. 
where n(x −i ) = (n 0 , . . . , n k ) with n j the number of components of x −i being equal to j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}.
We introduce two additional axioms, and first some notation. For i, j ∈ N , and v ∈ G(L), denote by v [ij] the multichoice game defined on the set (N [ij] = N \{i, j}∪[ij]), where [ij] indicates a single player, which is the merge of the distinct players i and j. The multichoice game v [ij] is defined as follows, {0, 1, . . . , k}.
2-Restricted efficiency (2-RE):
For all x ∈ L \ 0 N ,
The original 2-Efficiency [18] says that the worth alloted to a coalition of two players when they form a partnership shall be divided into the worth alloted to its members.
Here this axiom is considered only for the Dirac multichoice games. In the definition of δ
[ij]
x , we need to change x by adding some symmetry between i and j in the last two cases. The 2-Restricted efficiency axiom means that for the Dirac multichoice game, the sum of the values of two players equals to the value of the merge of these players in the corresponding reduced game. The first situation of δ [ij] x (y) is standard and generalizes the classical case. The last two cases are limit cases. If only one of the elements x i , x j belong to {0, k} but not the other one, then one shall take, for symmetry reasons, the same value for i and j. We need to take, for consistency reasons, the extreme value 0 or k that is reached by x i or x j .
For the classical Banzhaf value, the dummy player axiom (stronger than the null axiom) is used as a calibration property. When there is only one player left, the player shall get its worth v({i}). We generalize this idea by the following calibration axiom restricted to Dirac games.
Calibration axiom (C): Let i ∈ N , with n = 1. φ i (δ k N ) = 1. 
Proof : It is easy to check that the formula (2) satisfies the axioms. Conversely, we consider φ satisfying the axioms (L), (N), (I), (S), (2-RE) and (C). Let x ∈ L, we write x = (0 N \S∪T , x S , k T ), with x S ∈ L S \{0, k} S , S = Σ(x)\K(x), and T = K(x). From axioms (L), (N), (I) and (S) and Theorem 3, we have
and
From (3) and (4), we have, for any i ∈ T
and,
By axiom (2-RE) we have,
from (7), ∀s ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, with s + t ≤ n − 1,
from (6), ∀s ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, ∀t ∈ {2, . . . , n}, with s + t ≤ n,
from (5), ∀s ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, with s + t ≤ n,
and from (C) and (9), we have b 0,...,n−1 = 1 2 n−1 , ∀i ∈ N.
We distinguish the two following cases:
1. If S = ∅, from (11) and (8), we have b n−1,0,...,0 = b n−2,0,...,0,1 = . . . = b 1,0,...,0,n−2 = b 0,...,0,n−1 = 1 2 n−1 , (12) then, for every ∈ {1, . . . , n}, b n− ,0,...,0, −1 = 1 2 n−1 ,
by (9) and (12), we have: b n−2,0,...,0 = . . . = b 0,...,0,n−2 = 1 2 n−2 , then, for every ∈ {2, . . . , n}, b n− ,0,...,0, −2 = 1 2 n−1 , 2. If S = ∅, by (10) and (9), we have The result is proved.
We finally show that our value φ i (v) can be written as the sum of Banzhaf values over games derived from the multichoice game. This is related to some additivity property. More precisely, the power index φ i (v) takes the form of the sum over x ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} N of a classical Banzhaf value over the restriction of function v on × i∈N {x i , x i + 1}.
Let v ∈ G(L) and for any x ∈ L, such that x i < k, ∀i ∈ N , we define the game
Axiomatisation of the Banzhaf interaction index
An interaction index of a multichoice game v is a function I v : 2 N → R. The interaction of a single player i is the value related to player i. In this section, we present an axiomatisation of the interaction index based on the Banzhaf value. To this aim, we use the following generalised axioms introduced in [23] :
Linearity axiom (L) : I v is linear on G(L), i.e., ∀v, w ∈ G(L), ∀α ∈ R,
Null axiom (N): If a player i is null for v ∈ G(L), then for all T ⊆ N such that T i, I v (T ) = 0.
Invariance axiom (I): Let us consider two functions v, w ∈ G(L) such that, for all i ∈ N ,
Symmetry axiom (S): For all v ∈ G(L), for all permutation π on N ,
Let v be a multichoice game in G(L) and S ⊆ N . The restriction of v to N \ S,
Recursivity axiom (R): For any v ∈ G(L),
The Recursivity axiom is the exact counterpart of the one for classical games in [12] .
Ridaoui et al. [23] proved the following Lemma. 
where v
(−T )∪[A] [A]
is the restriction of v to T with respect to A ⊆ T defined on the set Our main result shows that there is a unique index fulfilling the previous axioms. By Lemma (1), we have
As for the power index φ i , the interaction index I v (T ) can be written as the sum of Banzhaf interaction indices over games derived from the multichoice game. 
